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THE FEDERAL RESERVE  ACT OF 1913 IN THE 
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James  Parthemos* 
Cursory  histories  of  United  States  money  and 
banking  usually  link  the  origins  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  to the  panic  of 1907,  to the  Aldrich- 
Vreeland  Act  of  1908,  and to the  monumental  work 
of  the  National  Monetary  Commission  established 
by  that  act.  It  is probably  more  revealing  to  inter- 
pret  the  original  Federal  Reserve  System  as  a key 
stage  in  a  process  of  monetary  and  banking  ex- 
perimentation  that  dates  back  to  the  beginnings  of 
the  nation.1 
The  first  125  years  of  the  nation’s  history  were 
marked  by  sharp  and  often  bitterly  divisive  contro- 
versies  over  money  and banking  arrangements.  Much 
of  the  history  of  the  period  can  be  written  around 
the  divisions  over  the  First  and  Second  Banks  of the 
United  States,  the  free  banking  movement  of  the 
middle  nineteenth  century,  the  national  banking 
system,  the  greenback  and free  silver  movements  in 
the  post-Civil  War period,  the  move  toward  an unam- 
biguous  gold  standard  in the  1890s,  and the  ground- 
swell  of reform  sentiment  at the  turn  of the  century 
that  culminated  in the  Federal  Reserve  Act.  All these 
developments  might  properly  be  viewed  as a fledg- 
ling  nation’s  experimental  efforts  to  establish  a  set 
of money  and banking  arrangements  congenial  to its 
unique  circumstances  and  political  values. 
For  better  or worse,  Americans  of the  nineteenth 
century  showed  little  disposition  to look  to Western 
Europe  for monetary  precedents.  While  recognizing 
and reflecting  the  cultural  legacy  of Western  Europe, 
American  society  had  developed  early  in its history 
a strong  sense  of  its  many  differences  with  the  na- 
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1 Monetary  experimentation  typified  the  colonial  period  as well, 
as the  colonies  sought  to establish  an adequate  payments  system. 
Banking  and  paper  money  schemes  were  important  issues  ex- 
acerbating  relations  with  the  mother  country.  See  Horace  White, 
Money and Banking,  Illustrated  by American History (Boston,  U.S.A. 
and  London:  Ginn  &Co.,  1896),  pp.  4-22,  248-58;  A.  Barton 
Hepburn,  A  History of Currency in the  United States  with  a Brief 
Description of the Currency Systems of All Commercial  Nations (New 
York: Macmillan  Co.,  1913,  pp.  1-12; Leslie  V. Brock,  The Cur- 
rency of the American Colonies, 1700-1764 (New  York:  Arno  Press, 
1973,  passim. 
tions  of Europe.  It harbored  a general  awareness  of 
sharp  differences  in historical  experience,  in political 
and  social  values,  in  geography,  and  in  economic 
potential.  Given  such  differences,  Europe  was  not 
to  be  emulated.  Rather  there  seemed  to  be  general 
agreement  that  the  country  had  to work  out  its own 
solutions,  consistent  with  its own  political  and social 
values  and  with  the  need  to  subdue  a vast  continen- 
tal expanse  of great  potential.  The  legacy  of the  fron- 
tier  did  much  to  shape  these  social  and  political 
values.  That  same  legacy  placed  a premium  on indi- 
vidual  initiative  and  fostered  a pragmatic  approach 
to public  problems  that  contrasted  with  the  rigid and 
often  doctrinaire  traditionalism  that  characterized 
much  of  Europe. 
I. 
Political and Geographic  Influences 
on U.S.  Monetary  Evolution 
The  principal  factors  affecting  money  and  bank- 
ing evolution  in the  nineteenth  century  were  the  na- 
tion’s  unique  political  values  and  its  vast,  untamed 
geographic  expanse. 
More  than  any other  contemporaneous  society,  the 
United  States  of that period  valued  individual  freedom 
and  abhorred  concentrations  of  power,  private  or 
governmental.  These  characteristics  comprised  an 
important  element  shaping  the  country’s  monetary 
experience.  The  political  structure  of  the  nation,  a 
federation  of quasi-sovereign  states,  reflected  these 
values.  Tension  between  the  federal  government  and 
individual  states  figured  importantly  in the  country’s 
early  efforts  to  establish  a  satisfactory  payments 
system.  For  the  first  forty  years  of the  new  nation’s 
existence  the  federal  government,  following  Alex- 
ander  Hamilton’s  carefully  drawn  blueprint,  pro- 
vided  monetary  and  banking  leadership.  Crucial  to 
this  leadership,  which  ran  from  1791  to  1833,  with 
a  five-year  hiatus,  1811-16,  were  the  First  and 
Second  Banks  of  the  United  States.  These  were 
quasi-governmental  institutions,  chartered  by  the 
federal  government,  with  the  issue  privilege  and em- 
powered  to  act  as fiscal  agent  for  the  United  States 
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settled  centers  of the  country  they  operated  nation- 
wide.  They  were  in  position  to  monitor  the  note- 
issues  of state-chartered  banks  and to enforce  specie 
redemption  of  these  notes. 
These  institutions  fell afoul  of strong  states’  rights 
sentiments  and  of  the  Jefferson-Jackson  party’s 
equally  strong  aversion  to  concentrations  of power. 
The  removal  of the  government’s  deposits  from  the 
Second  Bank  in  1833  and the  negation  of the  Bank’s 
fiscal agency  powers  mark  a temporary  end  of federal 
government  domination  of  banking  arrangements. 
From  1833  to  the  Civil  War  period  the  individual 
state  governments  directed  their  own  banking  evolu- 
tion,  with  no  interference  from  the  federal  govern- 
ment.  The  federal  government  again  assumed  a 
dominant  role  in  the  Civil  War  period  and  in  the 
decades  that  followed,  asserting  the  right  to  charter 
so-called  national  banks  and to use the  taxation  power 
to  deny  the  note-issue  privilege  to  nonnational 
institutions.  Nevertheless  state  governments,  through 
their  undiminished  authority  to  charter  banks,  were 
still  exercising  an  important  role  in  the  country’s 
monetary  affairs  on  the  eve  of the  establishment  of 
the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
The  country’s  vast  geographic  expanse,  stretching 
by  mid-century  from  ocean  to  ocean,  was  a second 
factor  in its monetary  evolution.  Until late in the  nine- 
teenth  century  much  of  the  country  was  sparsely 
settled.  Especially  in the  period  before  the  Civil War 
transportation  and  communication  facilities  were 
primitive  and  high-cost  over  large  areas  of  the 
country.  For  such  a  broad,  undeveloped  area  a 
payments  system  based  on banks  and bank  liabilities 
was  a practical  necessity.  For  local  payments  bank 
notes,  especially  those  of state-chartered  banks,  were 
the  standard  medium.  In parts  of the  country,  notably 
in New  England,  bank  notes  were  used  for  intercity 
payments  as  well,  owing  largely  to  the  so-called 
Suffolk  System  through  which  the  notes  of most  New 
England  banks  were  redeemed  at  par  in  Boston. 
Other  states,  notably  New  York,  South  Carolina, 
Louisiana,  and  later  Indiana,  had  state-chartered  or 
state-owned  banks  whose  notes  circulated  widely  at 
par.  But  in  much  of  the  country,  especially  in  the 
newer  states  of the  South  and  the  West,  efforts  to 
establish  a  trouble-free  bank  note  circulation  en- 
countered  problems  many  of which  were  attributable 
to  the  sparseness  of  settlement,  to  high  costs  of 
transportation  and  communication,  and  to  ineffec- 
tual bank  supervision.  Notes  circulating  at a distance 
from  the  issuing  bank  in  many  cases  could  be 
presented  for  redemption  only  at considerable  cost 
and  therefore  tended  to  go  to  a  discount.2  Some 
unscrupulous  bankers  deliberately  located  their 
offices  with  a view  to maximizing  the  cost  of present- 
ments.  The  notes  of these  so-called  “wildcat  banks” 
invariably  went  to  substantial  discount.  In any  case, 
for much  of the  period  between  1833  and  1860,  and 
in much  of the  West  and  the  South,  lax bank  super- 
vision  coupled  with  high  transportation  and  com- 
munication  costs  produced  a note  circulation  that was 
a  confused  hodgepodge  of  obligations  of  a  large 
number  of  small  banks,  many  of  doubtful  viability, 
circulating  at  various  rates  of  discount.3 
Neither  bank  notes  nor  specie  were  efficient 
means  of mediating  interregional  trade,  which  became 
increasingly  important  as  the  frontier  was  pushed 
westward.  In the  pre-Civil  War period  interregional-- 
and,  in  much  of  the  South  and  West,  intercom- 
munity-payments  involved  the  use  of trade  accep- 
tances  and bank  drafts  drawn  on regional  centers  and 
were  much  like international  payments.  The  business 
journals  of the  day  regularly  carried  exchange  quota- 
tions  on New  York,  Chicago,  New  Orleans  and other 
regional  centers.  In  the  West,  in particular,  private 
banks  joined  state-chartered  banks  in  providing 
facilities  for  interregional  payments. 
For  most  of  the  country  banking  markets  in that 
period  were  highly  local and,  except  in New  England, 
banking  systems  were  confined  within  state  bound- 
aries.  The  climate  of strong  states’  rights  sentiments 
and  popular  suspicions  of  concentrations  of  power 
militated  against  nationwide,  or even  any  significant 
2 Unless,  of  course,  the  point  of  issue  enjoyed  a  favorable 
payments  balance  with  the  point  at  which  the  note  was  cir- 
culating.  In  that  case  a note  circulating  at  a distance  from  the 
issuer  could  actually  go  to  a premium.  There  are  numerous  in- 
stances  in  pre-Civil  War  America  of  notes  of  respected  banks 
in  the  East  circulating  in  distant  parts  at  a premium. 
3 The  function  of monitoring  the  note  issues  of state  banks  and 
enforcing  convertibility  was  served  in  the  earlier  period  by  the 
Fist  and  Second  Banks  of  the  United  States.  In  the  absence 
of  these  institutions  “note  brokerage”  emerged  as  a profitable 
private  activity.  Note  brokers  bought  up notes  at a discount  and 
undertook  the  task  of  presenting  them  for  redemption.  Inter- 
estingly,  note  brokers  were  not  a popular  group  in the  business 
community  and  were  often  referred  to  pejoratively  as  “note 
shavers.”  For  an  account  of this  activity  in the  1833-60  period 
see  Davis  R.  Dewey,  State Banking Before the Civil War,  National 
Monetary  Commission,  Senate  Document  No.  581,  61st  Con- 
gress,  2nd  Session  (Washington,  D.C.:  Government  Printing 
Office),  pp.  74,  107-12. 
At  that  time  periodicals  called  bank  note  reporters  were 
indispensable  equipment  for  businessmen.  Such  periodicals 
carried  listings  of current  bank  notes  with  their  respective  rates 
of  discount  or  premia. 
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nantly  local  nature  of banking  markets,  some  degree 
of cooperation  between  banks  in different  regions  of 
the  country  was necessary  to  effective  payments  ar- 
rangements.  Out  of this  necessity  grew  a system  of 
correspondent  banking  unique  to  this  country. 
The  Civil  War  and  the  resulting  constitutional 
changes  radically altered  the relationship  of the federal 
government  to the  states  and established  the  former’s 
primacy  in shaping  the  monetary  order.  Nevertheless 
state  governments,  through  their  authority  to charter 
banks  and  to  regulate  state-chartered  institutions, 
continued  to exercise  an important  role  in the  coun- 
try’s  monetary  affairs.  They  played  a leading  role  in 
setting  branching  restrictions  and  in developing  ar- 
rangements  for  protecting  depositors  against  bank 
failures.5  But  control  over  the  nation’s  monetary 
base  passed  definitively  to  the  federal  government 
after  1863.  The  so-called  “dual banking  system”  that 
emerged  after the  war continued,  however,  to involve 
important  tensions  between  the  federal  government 
and  the  states. 
The  vast  expanse  of  the  country  continued  to 
affect  its monetary  evolution  even  after  the  develop- 
ment  of  state-of-the-art  transport  and  communica- 
tions  in the  latter  half  of the  nineteenth  century.  In 
that  period  of  rapid  economic  growth,  the  number 
of banks  multiplied  quickly.  Deposit  banking  grew 
apace  and  the  use  of  the  check  in  intercommunity 
and  interregional  payments  became  commonplace. 
The  banking  system  was  confronted  with  the  prob- 
lem  of  collecting  an  increasingly  large  number  of 
checks  drawn  on an increasingly  large number  of out- 
of-town  points,  with  many  checks  having  to  travel 
large  distances.  Long  delays  and  high  costs  in- 
volved  in  collecting  out-of-town  checks,  with  the 
resulting  magnified  check  float,  represented  an 
important  deficiency  in  the  payments  system  and 
in  arrangements  for  the  management  of  bank  re- 
4  There  were,  however,  some  cases  of multistate  banking.  The 
most  notable  case  is  that  of  the  Wisconsin  Marine  and  Fire 
Insurance  Company,  which  was  a bank  in everything  but  name. 
Its notes,  which  came  to be called  “George  Smith’s  money”  (after 
the  company’s  founder).  circulated  over  much  of  the  present- 
day Midwest  in the  1846s  and  1850s.  Smith  maintained  offices 
in Milwaukee.  Chicago.  Detroit.  St.  Louis.  Buffalo.  and  Galena, 
for  purposes  of redeeming  these  notes  either  in  specie  or New 
York  exchange.  His  company  was  chartered  first  in Wisconsin. 
When  that  charter  expired  Smith,  after  some  difficulty  with  the 
Wisconsin  legislature,  operated  under  a charter  issued  by  the 
Georgia  legislature.  See  Horace  White,  op.  cit.,  pp.  387-94. 
Banking  was prohibited  in some  states  and  in these  states  notes 
of out-of-state  banks  were  frequently  introduced  through  agents. 
5  See  Eugene  Nelson  White,  “State-Sponsored  Insurance  of 
Bank  Deposits  in  the  United  States,  1907-1929,”  Journal of 
Economic  History 41  (September  1981):  537-57. 
serves  in  the  period  before  the  Federal  Reserve 
was  established.6 
Finally,  the  continental  expanse  of the  country  em- 
braced  a diversity  of resource  patterns.  As the  fron- 
tier  was pushed  steadily  westward,  a corresponding 
diversity  of  regional  interests  emerged.  Economic 
sectionalism,  always  a major  factor  in United  States 
political  history,  figured  importantly  in the  nation’s 
money  and  banking  history  as well.  Credit  require- 
ments  of the  several  distinct  regions  were  popularly 
viewed  as being  in conflict.  Moreover,  in the  newer 
capital-short  states  of  the  South  and  the  West,  the 
natural  tendency  of  the  settled  and  more  highly 
developed  centers  of the  Northeast  to provide  finan- 
cial  leadership  was  viewed  with  suspicion.  The 
“money  monopoly”  of the  East,  real  or fancied,  was 
often  the  focal  center  of political  dialogue.  It played 
a major  role  in the  undoing  of the  First  and  Second 
Banks  of the  United  States,  in the free  banking  move- 
ment  at  mid-century  and,  in  the  post-Civil  War 
period,  in the  greenback  and free  silver  movements. 
It was  a major  factor  in the  dialogue  leading  to  the 
passage  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act. 
II. 
Halting Movement  Toward  a 
National System 
The  pre-Civil  War  period  of  state  domination  of 
banking  presents  a variety  of  experiments  in bank- 
ing  arrangements,  All states  at one  time  or  another 
tried  special  charter  banking.  Some  states  ex- 
perimented  with  outright  state  ownership  and opera- 
tion  of state  institutions.  A few states  for a time  even 
outlawed  banking.  The  Suffolk  System  in  New 
England  and  the  Safety  Fund  System  in New  York 
were  successful  experiments  in note-issue  banking. 
In  the  1850s  virtually  all states  adopted  free  bank- 
ing,  involving  general  laws  of  incorporation  under 
which  entry  into  banking  was open  to  any  who  met 
specified  conditions.  These  included  a requirement 
that  all notes  issued  be  secured  fully  by  state  bonds 
or  other  specified  assets.  This  free  banking  princi- 
ple  was  later  incorporated  into  the  National  Bank- 
ing  Act  of  1863. 
The  essential  point  here  is that  this  was  a period 
of  experimentation,  with  experiments  in individual 
states  often  having  more  destabilizing  than  stabiliz- 
ing effects.  Nor  did the  experimentation  end  follow- 
ing the  Civil War reforms.  Rather  the  focus  of it, like 
the  authority  over  money  and  banking  matters, 
shifted  towards  the  federal  government.  For  the 
6  See  infra,  p.  23. 
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ing Act,  periodic  banking  crisis  tended  to  call forth 
adjustments  in banking  and  currency  laws that  were 
more  in the  nature  of patchwork  than  reform.  In the 
case  of both  the  state  and  the  federal  governments, 
the  nature  of the  experimentation  was often  dictated 
more  by political  pressures  than  reasoned  economic 
analysis.  As  one  observer,  writing  in  the  middle 
1890s,  noted: 
It  is  safe  to  say  that  at  some  time  in  the  history  of  this 
country  nearly  every  theory  evolved  in connection  with  the 
business  of  banking  has  been  tried  and  its  development 
attempted.  It is equally  true  that  at all times  in the  country’s 
history,  in  all  sections  of  it,  and  among  all  classes  false 
principles  of monetary  science  and  bad  practices  in finance 
have  without  exception  resulted  disastrously  to  all  con- 
cerned.7 
For  the  entire  century,  trial and error,  as it were,  were 
the  order  of  the  day,  leading  frequently  to  serious, 
though  usually  short-lived,  monetary  disturbances. 
Experimentation  was  directed,  for  the  most  part, 
toward  establishing  a banking  and  currency  system 
free  of the  tendency  to periodic  crises.  But there  were 
also  problems  with  the  monetary  standard  and  the 
coinage  system  that  remained  unsolved  for a century 
after  the  adoption  of the  Constitution.  The  first Con- 
gress  adopted  a bimetallic  standard,  passed  a coinage 
act,  and provided  for the  establishment  of the  United 
States  Mint.  Yet  until  the  middle  of the  nineteenth 
century,  coins  of foreign  mintage  constituted  a large 
fraction  of the  country’s  metallic  money.  A  truly  na- 
tional  gold  coinage  system  was  established  by  the 
middle  1850s  following  the  large  influx  of gold  from 
California  mines.8  But the  larger  gold  supplies  made 
7  U.S.  Treasury,  Annual Report  of the  Comptroller  of the  Currency, 
1896,  vol.  1,  (Washington:  Government  Printing  Office,  1896), 
p.  36.  For  a  discussion  of  the  “unscientific”  nature  of  the  efforts 
at  monetary  and  banking  reform  before  1908  see  Henry  Parker 
Willis,  The  Federal  Reserve  System:  Legislation,  Organization  and 
Operation  (New  York:  Ronald  Press,  1923),  pp.  4-21.  For  con- 
tinued  experimentation  by  state  governments  see  Eugene  Nelson 
White,  “State-Sponsored  Insurance  of  Bank  Deposits  in  the 
United  States,  1907-1929,”  loc.  cit.,  pp.  537-43. 
8  Reports  of the  Secretary  of the  Treasury  of the  United  States,  1845 
(Washington,  D.C.:  Printed  by  John  C.  Rives,  1851),  vol.  5, 
pp.  18-20.  Hereinafter  cited  Reports  of the Secretary  of the  Treasury 
with  appropriate  year.  See  also  vol.  6,  pp.  9-10. 
It  should  be  noted  that  in  the  1840s  gold  and  silver  coins 
moved  freely  in  foreign  trade.  There  was  always  a  good  proba- 
bility  that  gold  coin  arriving  in  this  country  would  be  shipped 
out  again  before  long.  Hence  there  was  an  understandable  reluc- 
tance  to  recoin  foreign  coins.  Secretaries  of  the  Treasury  in  the 
1840s  and  1850s  urged  recoinage  and  sought  establishment  of 
a  mint  at  New  York  City,  where  most  foreign  coin  arrived,  to 
facilitate  “Americanization”  of  the  gold  coinage.  See  Reports  of 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  the  years  1845-55. 
For  a  contemporary’s  description  of  the  coinage  circulating 
in  the  western  states  before  the  California  gold  discoveries  see 
Hugh  McCulloch,  Men  and  Measures  of  Half  a  Century  (New 
York:  Charles  Scribner’s  Sons,  1900)  p.  119. 
problems  for  the  bimetallic  standard.  The  silver 
coinage  was reduced  to  subsidiary  status  in 1853  but 
became  the  focus  of new  sectional  controversy  follow- 
ing large  new  silver  discoveries  in the  years  follow- 
ing the  Civil War.  Large  new  gold  discoveries  in the 
1890s  put  an  end  to  the* agitation  over  silver  and 
finally  led  to  the  formal  adoption  of  the  gold  stan- 
dard  in 1900.  The  coinage  system,  including  the  frac- 
tional  denominations  that  are familiar  today,  was not 
firmly  established  until  nearly  a century  after  passage 
of  the  first  coinage  act. 
A uniform  bank  note  circulation  current  in all parts 
of the  country  was not  achieved  until  passage  of the 
National  Banking  Act  in  1863.  This  act  established 
the  office  of the  Comptroller  of the  Currency  to issue 
bank  charters  under  specified  conditions  and to super- 
vise  the  institutions  so  chartered.  These  national 
banks,  so called,  were  authorized  to issue  circulating 
notes  against  collateral  of  government  securities.9 
The  levy  in  1866  of  a  10 percent  tax  on  the  notes 
of state-chartered  institutions  effectively  gave  national 
banks  a monopoly  of the  circulating  privilege.  From 
that  year  until  the  establishment  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  national  bank  notes  comprised  a key 
component  of  the  nation’s  chief  currency. 
These  notes,  gold  certificates,  and  the  greenbacks 
issued  in the  Civil  War  period  constituted  the  cur- 
rency  of the  immediate  post-Civil  War years.  But the 
slow  growth  in  the  money  stock  in  the  1870s, 
coupled  with  rapid  economic  growth,  led to a secular 
deflation  that  soon  produced  strong  popular 
movements  for monetary  expansion,  the  greenback 
and  free  silver  movements  of  the  1870-95  period. 
The  first  of these  movements  succeeded  in ending 
the  progressive  redemption  of the  Civil  War  green- 
backs,  leaving  $347  million  of these  as a permanent 
part  of  the  circulation.  The  second  led  to  passage 
of two silver purchase  acts and the  issue of some  $500 
million  of  silver  dollars  and  silver-backed  U.S. 
Treasury  notes. 
At  the  turn  of  the  century,  the  nation’s  currency 
comprised  national  bank  notes  supplemented  by fixed 
quantities  of United  States  notes  and Treasury  notes 
of  1890.  A gold  redemption  fund  was  held  by  the 
Treasury  against  the  U.S.  notes.  The  Treasury  notes 
of  1890  were  backed  dollar  for  dollar  by  silver  and 
were,  in effect,  silver  certificates.  Gold  certificates, 
backed  dollar  for dollar  by  gold  coin,  also circulated. 
A  uniform  circulation  was  at  last  in  place,  with  all 
9  Initially,  the  collateral  requirement  called  for $100  of securities 
backing  $90 of notes.  This  was  later reduced  to a dollar-for-dollar 
backing.  See  A.  Barton  Hepburn,  A  History of Currency in  the 
United States  (New  York:  Macmillan  Co.,  1915),  pp.  308-9. 
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forms  of  money  required  by  law  to  circulate  at 
parity  with  gold. 
The  banking  industry  changed  drastically  in  the 
decades  following  the  Civil  War.  The  number  of 
banks  multiplied  rapidly  to  keep  pace  with  ac- 
celerating  economic  and  population  growth  as  the 
frontier  was  pushed  steadily  westward.  Banks 
chartered  under  the  National  Banking  Act  accounted 
for most  of the  banking  expansion  in the early postwar 
years,  largely  because  of  their  legislated  monopoly 
on  note  issue.  But  state  banks  adapted  by  empha- 
sizing  deposit  banking,  which  soon  submerged  note- 
issue banking  in importance.  While  the  numbers  and 
total  deposits  of both  national  and nonnational  banks 
increased  sharply  between  1880  and  1910,  the 
latter  group  grew  more  rapidly  by  a  considerable 
margin  and by  1910  accounted  for more  than  50 per- 
cent  of  total  deposits. 
Banks  in  both  groups  were  required  to  hold 
minimum  legal reserves.  For  nonnational  banks,  the 
legal  requirements  were  governed  by  state  laws and 
varied  from  state  to  state.  The  National  Banking  Act 
established  a system  of reserve  requirements  for na- 
tional  banks,  which  for  reserve  purposes  were 
classified  as country,  reserve  city,  and central  reserve 
city  banks.  Country  banks  were  allowed  to  hold  up 
to 60 percent  of the  required  reserve  on deposit  with 
reserve  city  or  central  reserve  city  banks.  Similarly 
reserve  city  banks  were  allowed  to  hold  half  of the 
required  reserve  with  central  reserve  city banks.  New 
York,  Chicago,  and  later  St.  Louis,  were  designated 
as central  reserve  city  banks.  The  number  of reserve 
cities  increased  from  13 in  1880  to  28  in  1900  and 
46  in  1910,  reflecting  the  rapid  growth  of the  coun- 
try  and of the  number  of banking  institutions.  Some 
part  of the  reserves  of nonnational  banks  were  also 
held  as deposits  with  reserve  city  and central  reserve 
city  banks.10 
On  the  eve  of  the  establishment  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  the  nation  was served  by more  than 
25,000  banking  institutions.  Included  in this number 
were  commercial  banks,  both  state  and  national, 
mutual  savings  banks,  trust  companies,  and  private 
banks.  For  most  of these  institutions  markets  were 
primarily  local,  although  correspondent  connections 
provided  limited  entry  to  other  markets.  Banks  in 
the  reserve  cities  and central  reserve  cities  operated 
clearinghouses,  some  of  which  were  in position  to 
render  limited  central  bank  services  to  banks  over 
a  limited  market  area.  Supervision  of  this  large 
multitude  of institutions,  at the  federal  as well as the 
state  level,  was  of  questionable  effectiveness.” 
The  U.S.  Treasury,  through  its Independent  Sub- 
Treasury  System,  could  influence  banking  and credit 
markets  and often  performed  important  central  bank- 
ing functions.  It systematically  moved  funds  between 
the  subtreasuries  and  the  banking  system  to  affect 
credit  conditions  and  especially  to  meet  seasonal 
credit  demands  in  agricultural  areas.  It  sometimes 
made  advance  payments  of interest  and principal  on 
outstanding  government  bonds  by  way  of relieving 
pressures  on  money  market  banks.  It  handled  the 
issue  and  redemption  of  U.S.  notes  and  Treasury 
notes  of  1890  and  supervised  the  issue  and  redemp- 
tion  of  national  bank  notes.  It  was  custodian  and 
manager  of  the  nation’s  gold  reserve  and  was  em- 
powered  to buy  and  sell government  securities  inci- 
dent  to  the  maintenance  of  this  reserve  within 
legally  specified  limits.12 
10  See  Annual  Reports  of  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  1880, 
p.  CXVI;  1900,  p.  356;  1910,  p.  250  and  footnote. 
11 The  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  had  broad  authority  over 
national  banks  and  required  regular  reports  of  them.  Neither  he 
nor  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  were  in  position  to  monitor 
effectively  the  reserve  base  of  the  banking  system.  Comments 
of  bankers  operating  under  national  charters  before  1914  sug- 
gest  that  the  Comptroller  and  the  Secretary  were  the  func- 
tionaries  who  really  controlled  national  bank  activities  and  that 
they  could  at  times  be  heavy  handed.  But  bankers  always  had 
the  option  of  shifting  to  state  charters  and  this  option  no  doubt 
had  a  moderating  effect  on  the  federal  regulators.  Comment  at 
the  time  of  the  establishment  of  the  Federal  Reserve  often 
implied  that  bankers  preferred  regulation  by  the  seven-man 
Federal  Reserve  Board  to  the  two-man  arrangement  existing 
before  1914. 
12  Esther  R.  Taus,  Central  Banking  Functions  of the  United  States 
Treasury,  1789-1941  (New  York:  Columbia  University  Press, 
1943).  Taus  writes:  “.  . . [The  U.S.  Treasury’s]  powers  frightened 
cautious  businessmen  and  contributed  to  the  establishment  in 
1913  of  an  organization  which  was  intended  to  handle  exclusively 
the  central  banking  functions  previously  assumed  by  the 
Treasury,”  p.  98.  See  also  Milton  Friedman  and  Anna  J. 
Schwartz,  A  Monetary  History  of  the  United  States,  1867-1960 
(Princeton,  NJ.:  Princeton  University  Press,  1963)  pp.  149-52. 
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Perceived  Deficiencies in the Pre-Federal 
Reserve  Arrangements 
Contemporary  critics  found  serious  deficiencies  in 
both  the  currency  and the  banking  arrangements  that 
existed  at the  turn  of the  century.  The  currency  was 
deemed  to  be  “inelastic,”  that  is incapable  of varia- 
tion  as required  to meet  the  changing  needs  of trade. 
The  banking  system  was  considered  to  be  inade- 
quately  supervised  and  to  suffer  from  seriously 
defective  reserve  arrangements.  Arrangements  for 
clearing  and  collecting  interbank  claims  were 
widely  viewed  as impeding  the  development  of  an 
efficient  payments  system  and  promoting  abuses  in 
bank  practices. 
Of  the  principal  currency  types,  the  quantity  of 
U.S.  notes  was  fixed.  The  silver  component  could 
be  increased  only  by act of Congress.  The  gold  com- 
ponent  was at the  mercy  of the  balance  of payments. 
Increases  in the  national  bank  note  circulation  were 
limited,  though  loosely,  by  the  outstanding  volume 
of appropriate  government  securities.  These  were  the 
characteristics  that  gave  rise  to the  criticism  that  the 
currency  was incapable  of variation  to meet  the  needs 
of  trade.13  This  criticism  was  not  always  separable 
from  that  focusing  on  the  vulnerability  of the  bank- 
ing  system  to  recurring  panics.  To  some  observers 
“inelasticity”  consisted  in  the  system’s  inability  to 
accommodate  a significantly  heightened  demand  for 
currency  without  producing  monetary  contraction  and 
serious  problems  for  many  banks. 
Contemporaneous  criticism  of  the  system  of 
reserves  was not  always consistent.  Some  critics  com- 
plained  of the  scattering  of reserves  over  numerous 
reserve  cities,  while  others  complained  of  the  con- 
centration  of  reserves  in  New  York. 
Much  discussion  centered  around  the  so-called 
“pyramiding”  of  reserves  and  certain  abusive  prac- 
tices  resulting  from  city  bank  competition  for corre- 
spondent  balances.  Critics  noted  that  a country  bank’s 
reserve  balance  at  a  reserve  city  bank,  when 
redeposited  by the  latter  at a central  reserve  city,  ac- 
tually  served  as a legal  reserve  for  both  the  country 
and  the  reserve  city  bank.  In  that  fashion  reserves 
were  “pyramided”  and  the  banking  system’s  lawful 
money14  reserves  were  less than  the  reserves  shown 
on  the  books  of  banks.  The  alleged  overconcen- 
13 For  a discussion  of two  interpretations  of the  term  “inelasticity” 
as  applied  to  the  currency  of  the  time  see  Friedman  and 
Schwartz,  op.  cit.,  pp.  168-69. 
14 Lawful  money  was  defined  to  include  gold  and  silver  coin, 
greenbacks,  silver  certificates,  gold  certificates,  and  Treasury 
notes  of  1890. 
tration  of reserves  in New  York  was  widely  viewed 
as  a  source  of  volatility  in  money  markets,  espe- 
cially precarious  when  large  interregional  transfers  of 
funds  within  the  banking  system  had  to  be  made.15 
Considered  equally  serious  was  the  effect  on 
reserves  of banking  practices  that  developed  in con- 
nection  with  the  handling  of  out-of-town  checks 
through  city  correspondents.  By the  turn  of the  cen- 
tury,  competition  among  city  correspondents  for the 
accounts  of  country  banks  led  many  of  the  former 
to  offer  collection  services  for  respondents.  Among 
the  inducements  offered  was  immediate  credit  for 
items  sent  for  collection.  In the  absence  of effective 
reserve  monitoring,  country  banks  often  counted  as 
reserves  checks  en  route  by  mail  to  a reserve  city 
correspondent  serving  as  its  reserve  agent.  In  like 
fashion,  the  reserve  city  bank  would  send  some  of 
the  same  checks  to its central  reserve  city,  counting 
them  as reserves  as soon  as they  were  in the  mail. 
Thus  the  same  check  in transit  often  served  to meet 
the  reserve  requirements  of  both  the  country  and 
the  city  bank  and  stated  reserves  appear  to  have 
included  large  amounts  of  uncollected  funds. 
Other  questionable  banking  practices  characterized 
the  system  for  collecting  out-of-town  checks.  Col- 
lection  entailed  costs  and  to  cover  these,  banks 
sometimes  levied  direct  collection  charges.  Many 
smaller  ones  levied  exchange  or remittance  charges 
through  remitting  less than  the  face value of presented 
checks.  In the  context  of the  time  out-of-pocket  costs 
could  frequently  be  reduced-though  real  costs 
increased-through  a  variety  of  interbank  ar- 
rangements  that  had  the  effect  of delaying  presenta- 
tion,  often  through  highly  circuitous  and uneconomic 
routing.16  As  a  result,  the  outstanding  check  float 
at any given  time  was far greater  than  it needed  to be. 
IV. 
Structuring  the Remedies 
Among  serious  students  of monetary  affairs  senti- 
ment  for basic  reform  in the  currency  and  the  bank- 
ing system  was strong  even  before  the  panic  of  1907. 
15 See  Annual  Report  of the  Comptroller of the Currency,  1914, 
vol.  1,  pp.  8-10. 
16 For  a discussion  of check  collection  practices  and  problems 
in the  pre-Federal  Reserve  period  see  Waker  E. Spahr, The  Clear- 
ing and Collection of Checks  (New  York:  Bankers  Publishing  Com- 
pany,  1926),  pp.  96-130.  See  also  Pierre  Jay,  “The  Country 
Banker  and  the  Federal  Reserve  System,”  a speech  at  a  ban- 
quet  given  by  the  Jefferson  County  National  Bank,  Watertown, 
N.Y.,  April  17,  1916.  In  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond 
Archives.  Jay  was  the  first  chairman  of  the  board  of  directors 
of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York. 
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duced  a rich  ferment  of ideas  for reform.17  The  panic 
of  1907  crystallized  reform  sentiment  and  gave  it a 
strong  popular  base,  making  a basic  overhaul  of cur- 
rency  and banking  arrangements  virtually  inevitable. 
The  issue  moved  quickly  into  the  political  arena, 
there  to  be  shaped  into  a reform  package  designed 
to meet  political  as well  as economic  tests.  The  Na- 
tional  Monetary  Commission,  established  by  the 
Aldrich-Vreeland  Act,  produced  a massive  23-volume 
study  of banking,  both  here  and  in advanced  foreign 
countries,  which  provided  the  economic  input 
deemed  necessary  for  rational  reform. 
From  the  political  standpoint,  the  widespread 
suspicion  of the  existence  of a sinister  “money  trust” 
had  to  be  mollified,  but  without  sacrificing  the  sup- 
port  and  the  skills  of  professionals  in  the  financial 
community.  Shifting  of power  in the  banking  system 
from  large  banks  and  clearinghouse  associations  to 
the  federal  government,  while  desirable,  had  to  be 
limited  and engineered  with caution.  The  role of state 
governments  had  to  be  respected.  Strong  sectional 
feelings  regarding  real or fancied  regional  credit  needs 
of  a unique  and  often  conflicting  nature  had  to  be 
satisfied.  Popular  antipathies  to  Europe’s  monolithic 
style  of central  banks  had  to  be  accommodated.  In 
brief,  peculiarly  American  political  and cultural  values 
placed  restrictions  on  reform  that  sometimes  took 
precedence  over  state-of-the-art  economic  logic. 
The  intensified  reform  dialogue  after  1907  pro- 
duced  finally,  and after  several  iterations,  the  Federal 
Reserve  Act,  passed  in  December  1913.  The  title 
of the  act  emphasizes  the  economic  problems  con- 
fronted:  An  act  to  provide  for  the  establishment  of 
Federal  Reserve  Banks,  to  furnish  an  elastic  cur- 
rency,  to  afford  means  of rediscounting  commercial 
paper,  to  establish  a more  effective  supervision  of 
banking,  and  for  other  purposes.  The  “other  pur- 
poses”  were  concerned  with  improving  the  payments 
system  through  more  efficient  collection  and  clear- 
ing of checks  and with  the  provision  of fiscal services 
to the  U.S.  Treasury.  The  detail  of the  act, however, 
clearly  reflects  the  framers’  deferences  to prevailing 
political  values. 
The  act  provides  for  the  division  of  the  country 
into  no  more  than  twelve  and  no  fewer  than  eight 
Federal  Reserve  Districts,  with  a  Reserve  Bank 
located  in each.  Division  of the  country  into  districts 
recognized  the  existence  of  differing  regional  in- 
terests.  It  also  represented  an  attempt  to  effect  a 
regional  as opposed  to  a centralized  deployment  of 
17 For  an  account  of the  dialogue  and  proposals  in that  period 
see  Willis,  op.  cit.,  pp.  3-23. 
the  banking  system’s  reserves  and  to  set  up 
machinery  for  efficient  clearing  and  collection  of 
interbank  claims.  Avoidance  of a monolithic  central 
bank  in  the  style  of  European  countries  was  also  a 
consideration. 
The  Reserve  Banks  were  incorporated  under 
charters  issued  by the  Comptroller  of the  Currency. 
The  act prescribed  a minimum  capital  of $4 million, 
to be  subscribed  by member  commercial  banks.  Na- 
tional  banks  were  required  to  become  members  of 
the  new  reserve  system  and to purchase  stock  of the 
Reserve  Banks  of their  respective  districts.18  Mem- 
bership  for  state  banks  was  made  optional,  reflect- 
ing  the  framers’  respect  for  state  governmental 
authority.  As the  System  took  form,  member  banks 
emerged  as  the  sole  owners  of  the  stock  of  the 
Reserve  Banks,19  but  their  ownership  and  manage- 
ment  rights  were  closely  circumscribed.  Their  right 
to  share  in  Reserve  Banks’  earnings  was  limited  to 
a cumulative  dividend  of up  to  six percent  on  their 
holdings  of  Reserve  Bank  stock. 
Arrangements  for managing  the  individual  Reserve 
Banks  were  specified  in detail  in the  act  and  reflect 
further  limitations  on ownership  rights.  Management 
was put  in the  hands  of a board  of directors  of nine 
persons,  grouped  in three  separate  classes  of  three 
persons  each:  Class A to represent  the  stock-holding 
member  banks  of the  district;  Class  B to  represent 
the  commercial,  agricultural,  and  industrial  interest 
of the  district:  Class  C to represent  the  broad  public 
interest.  The  act provided  for election  of Class A and 
Class  B  directors  by  the  member  banks,  which 
themselves  were  divided  into three  size classes,  large, 
middle  size,  and  small,20 with  each  size  class  elect- 
ing  one  class  A  and  one  class  B  director. 
The  power  to  appoint  the  Class  C  directors  was 
vested  in the  Federal  Reserve  System’s  chief  coor- 
dinating  body,  the  Federal  Reserve  Board.  One 
Class  C  director  was  designated  chairman  of  the 
board  and  Federal  Reserve  Agent.  A  second  was 
designated  deputy  chairman  and  deputy  Federal 
18 A  member  bank  was required  to subscribe  to the  capital  stock 
of its  Reserve  Bank  in an amount  equal  to  6 percent  of its paid- 
up capital  and  surplus.  Initially  only  half of this  was paid  in, with 
the  other  half  remaining  on  call:  The  act  also  provided  for 
adjustment  of  the  capital  stock  subscription  as  the  members’ 
capital  and  surplus  grew.  See  Willis,  op.  cit.,  pp.  1674-75. 
19 The  act  provided  for  sale  of Federal  Reserve  Bank  stock  to 
the  public  and  to  the  U.S.  government  in  case  the  minimum 
$4  million  capital could  not  be  raised  through  member  bank 
subscriptions.  Such  sales never  became  necessary.  Ibid.,  p.  1669. 
20 The  act provided  for division  of the  member  banks  into  three 
groups  “of similar  capitalization,”  that  is on  the  basis  of  capital 
and  surplus,  with  approximately  equal  numbers  in each  group. 
Ibid.,  pp.  1672-73. 
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direct  representatives  of the  Federal  Reserve  Board 
in the  management  of the  individual  banks.  The  act 
provided  that  no  officer,  director,  employee,  or 
stockholder  of  a commercial  bank  could  serve  as a 
Class C director  and no officer,  director,  or employee 
of a commercial  bank  could  serve  as a Class  B direc- 
tor.  The  term  of office  for directors  was made  three 
years.21  Such  detailed  specification  of the  composi- 
tion  of the  boards  of directors  reflects  efforts  of the 
framers  of  the  act  to  ensure  against  domination  by 
any  interest  group  and  especially  by  large  banks. 
To  supervise  and  coordinate  the  activities  of the 
Reserve  Banks,  the  act  established  the  Federal 
Reserve  Board,  consisting  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  and  the  Comptroller  of the  Currency  serv- 
ing  ex  officio  and  five  members  appointed  by  the 
President  with  the  approval  of the  Senate.  No  more 
than  one  of  these  five  members  could  be  selected 
from  any one  Federal  Reserve  District  and the  Presi- 
dent  was further  required  to choose  them  with  “due 
regard  to  a fair  representation  of the  different  com- 
mercial,  industrial  and  geographical  divisions  of the 
country.”  This  seven-man  body,  to be chaired  by the 
Secretary  of the  Treasury,  provided  a degree  of cen- 
tralization  under  federal  authority,  although  it  was 
envisaged  that  the  Reserve  Banks  would  act  with  a 
high  degree  of autonomy  in meeting  regional  credit 
and  currency  requirements.22 
While  the  framers  of the  act were  careful  to guard 
against  banker  domination,  they  were  equally  careful 
to  encourage  constructive  participation  in  the  new 
arrangement  by the  big city bankers.  The  latter  group 
was  amply  represented  in  the  give-and-take  that 
shaped  the  specific  provisions  of the  act.  Yet many- 
perhaps  most-remained  especially  skeptical  of the 
significant  shift  of  authority  over  banking  to  the 
federal  government.  23  As a concession  to this group, 
the  act  established  the  Federal  Advisory  Council 
21 In  keeping  with  the  principle  of regionalism,  directors  were 
required  to  meet  requirements  of residency  in  their  respective 
districts.  Ibid. 
22 The  virtual  autonomy  of the  boards  of directors  of the  regional 
banks  in managing  the  discount  function  under  broad  guidelines 
issued  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  was  repeatedly  empha- 
sized.  See,  for  example,  “Truth  About  the  Federal  Reserve 
Svstem.”  Speech  of Hon.  Carter  Glass  of Virginia  in the  Senate 
of  the  United  States,  January  16  and  17,  1922  (Washington 
1922),  pp.  8-9.  In Federal  Reserve  Bank of Richmond  Historical 
Collection  RG  1:2,  Box  No.  3. 
23 Willis, op. cit.,  pp.  385ff.  See  also  The Intimate  Papers  of 
Colonel  House, Arranged  as  a Narrative by Charles Seymour (Boston 
and  New  York:  Houghton  Mifflin  Company,  1926),  pp.  160-66. 
See  also  “Truth  About  the  Federal  Reserve  System,”  Speech 
by  Glass,  loc.  cit. 
consisting  of  prominent  bankers,  chosen  one  to  a 
Reserve  District  by  the  Reserve  Bank  directors. 
Envisaged  for this council  was a purely  advisory  role. 
The  framers  of the  act were  confident  that  the  new 
system  would  eliminate  definitively  the  basic  defects 
in  the  old  arrangements.  A new  national  currency, 
Federal  Reserve  notes  issued  by the  Reserve  Banks, 
would  supplant  the  “inelastic”  national  bank  notes 
and  provide  the  necessary  variability  to  meet  the 
changing  needs  of  trade.  These  notes  were  made 
obligations  of the  federal  government  as well ‘as the 
issuing Reserve  Bank.  They  were  to be issued  against 
a 40 percent  gold  reserve  and a 100 percent  collateral 
of specified  types  of commercial  paper  that were  eligi- 
ble for rediscount  at the  Federal  Reserve  Banks.  The 
theory  here  was that  linking the  Federal  Reserve  note 
issue to eligible  commercial  paper,  which  presumably 
reflected  the  variations  in trade  volume,  would  en- 
sure  that  the  note  issue  would  vary  with  the  “needs 
of  trade.“24  Hence  the  problem  of  the  “inelastic” 
currency  would  be  solved. 
Similarly  the  redeployment  of the  banking  system’s 
reserves  in a few  regional  centers,  along  with  other 
changes  in reserve  arrangements,  was  viewed  as at 
once  eliminating  the  problem  of  “pyramided 
reserves,”  allowing  close  monitoring  of  the  quality 
of reserves,  and  putting  the  Reserve  Banks  in posi- 
tion  to  serve  regional  credit  and  currency  require- 
ments.  The  act reduced  reserve  requirements  for all 
classes  of  member  banks  but  provided  that,  after  a 
transition  period,  reserves  were  to  be  held  as cash 
in vault  or  deposits  in  the  district  Federal  Reserve 
Bank,  divided  equally  between  these  two.25 Such  a 
deployment  of  reserves,  coupled  with  the  Reserve 
Banks’ authority  to rediscount  each  others’ paper,  was 
thought  to  ensure  that  the  banking  system’s  reserve 
base  could  quickly  be  mobilized  to  meet  extraordi- 
nary  banking  pressures  in  particular  geographical 
regions.  Moreover  such  a deployment  of reserves  was 
designed  in part  to place  the  Reserve  Banks  in posi- 
tion  to be efficient  collectors  of interbank  claims  and, 
ideally,  to  serve  as an effective  clearinghouse  for the 
entire  banking  system.  Hence  a  solution  was  pro- 
vided  for  the  multiplicity  of  problems  arising  from 
the  old system  of clearing  and collecting  out-of-town 
checks. 
24 This  so-called  commercial  loan  theory  or  real  bills  doctrine 
was  a basic  principle  underlying  the  money  functions  of the  new 
system.  The  essential  fallacy  in the  doctrine  was  that  note  issue 
would  also  vary  with  the  price  level  as well  as  the  real  volume 
of trade.  Thus  its  operation  would  be  inherently  inflationary  or 
deflationary.  See  Friedman  and  Schwartz,  op.  cit.,  pp.  191-92. 
25 Later  amendments  to the  act provided  for holding  of all legal 
reserves  with  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks. 
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rency  were  widely  viewed  as the  causes  of recurring 
banking  panics,  the  currency  and  reserve  reforms 
were  deemed  to  provide  insurance  against  such 
panics.  Working  toward  the  same  end  was  the  pro- 
vision of the  act strengthening  bank  examination  prac- 
tices  and ‘procedures.  The  benign  coordination  of the 
Reserve  Banks’  operations  by  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board  was  expected  to  provide  added  insurance.26 
V. 
Central Bank or Central Banking System? 
The  original  Federal  Reserve  System  was  the 
product  of a uniquely  American  political  process  con- 
fronting  a pressing  need  to remove  systemic  defects 
from  the  nation’s  money,  banking,  and payments  ar- 
rangements.  It  was  forged  as  a  politically  feasible 
solution  to  the  interrelated  problems  of  an unsatis- 
factory  currency,  deficiencies  in the  payments  and 
banking  systems,  and  recurring  financial  panics. 
As in most  political  settlements,  the  chief  feature 
of  the  act  passed  in  December  1913  was  com- 
promise.  To  an  important  extent  both  regionalism 
and  centralization  were  accommodated.  The  act  in- 
corporated  a clear  intent  to  serve  regional  interests 
but  in the  context  of a greater  degree  of centralized 
coordination  than  had  existed  before.  Provision  for 
management  of the  Reserve  Banks  reflects  an effort 
to  harmonize  borrower  and  lender  interests  while 
recognizing  a  higher  public  interest  that  was  a 
proper  concern  of government.  The  authority  of the 
federal  government  over  the  banking  industry  was 
enhanced  but  in  a manner  that  avoided  confronta- 
tion with  state  governments.  While  the  shift of power 
away from  the large money  center  banks  encountered 
strong  resistance,  a compromise  satisfactory  to  the 
private  banking  sector  was worked  out.  The  highly 
structured  system  it envisaged  left room  for a limited 
private  sector  participation  in the  discharge  of a key 
public  function.  It came  to be  referred  to  as a quasi- 
private,  quasi-public  system  although  it is clear  that 
the  public  feature  predominated. 
It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  the  framers  of  the 
original  system  studiously  eschewed  the  term  “cen- 
tral bank,”  presumably  for fear that  the  term  may play 
on popular  suspicions  of centralized  control  over  the 
26 Glass,  Harding,  and  Williams  frequently  stated  publicly  that 
the  new  system  virtually  guaranteed  that  there  would  be  no more 
panics.  See,  for example,  Richmond,  Va. News Leader,  May  14, 
1914, p.  1. See  also “Truth  About  the  Federal  Reserve  System,” 
Speech  by  Glass,  loc.  cit. 
nation’s  money and  credit.27  For  the  most  part  their 
commentaries  on  the  System  emphasized  its  pri- 
marily  regional  nature  and  limited  Federal  Reserve 
Board  control  over  the  rediscounting  and  currency 
issuing  operations  of the  regional  Banks.  Much  was 
also  made  of the  provisions  of the  act  that  required 
that  Reserve  Bank  directors,  even  those  appointed 
by  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  be  residents  of their 
respective  Federal  Reserve  Districts  and  therefore 
sensitive  to  peculiar  regional  needs. 
Yet the  act clearly  envisaged  a significant  enhance- 
ment  of  centralized  authority  over  the  nation’s 
money,  banking,  and payments  systems.  It gave  the 
Reserve  Banks  a monopoly  of the  issue privilege  and 
made  the  U.S.  government  a guarantor  of the  banks’ 
notes.  It made  the  Federal  Reserve  System  the  cus- 
todian  of the  banking  system’s  reserves  with authority 
to monitor  the  reserves  of individual  member  banks. 
It vested  in the  System  the  power  to  set  the  terms 
on which  rediscounting  would  be available to member 
banks.  The  Reserve  Banks  were  given  the  author- 
ity  to engage  in open  market  operations  in gold  and 
in a variety  of domestic  credit  instruments  and foreign 
exchange.  The  act  clearly  envisaged  a more  effec- 
tive  system  of  federal  bank  examinations  than  had 
existed  heretofore,  with the  System  sharing that func- 
tion  with  the  Comptroller  of the  Currency.  Finally, 
it  was  clearly  envisaged  that  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board  would  become  a major  participant  in the  custo- 
dianship  and  management  of  the  nation’s  gold 
reserve.  In view  of such  a concentration  of functions 
and  powers  in the  new  system,  the  denials  of some 
of its chief  architects  that  it was a central  bank  must 
be  interpreted  as emphasizing  the  diffusion  of these 
powers  over  the  System’s  thirteen  units  and the  fact 
that  the  System  was  uniquely  different  from  its 
foreign  counterparts. 
The  system  that  was put  in place  in 1914 was not, 
and was not  intended  to be,  a finished  product.  While 
confident  that  the  deficiencies  in the  old system  had 
been  eliminated,  the  founders  recognized  that  the 
dynamic  of the  U.S.  economy  would  in time  require 
adjustments.  Indeed  many  minor  amendments  in the 
enabling  legislation  were  made  in the  first  few years 
of the  System’s  life. The  trials the  System  confronted 
in the  1929-33  period  dispelled  the  founders’  opti- 
mism  that  sharp  financial  disturbances  were  things 
27 See,  for example,  “Truth  About  the  Federal  Reserve  System,” 
Speech  by Glass,  loc. cit.  See  also “The  Federal  Reserve  System, 
What  it  is  and  What  it  is Not,”  Address  by  W.P.G.  Harding, 
Governor,  Federal  Reserve  Board,  at  the  ‘Made-in-Carolinas’ 
Exposition  at Charlotte,  N.C.,  September  22,  1921.  Published 
by  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond.  September  1921. 
p:  4. Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Richmond,  Historical  Collection; 
RG  1:2,  Box  No.  3. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  27 of  the  past.  These  led  to  a  major  overhaul  of  the 
System  in the  mid-1930s.  The  major  reforms  of that 
period,  along  with  further  important  amendments 
since  that  time,  have  produced  a  system  funda- 
mentally  different,  both  in  structure  and  in  ap- 
proaches  to  money  and  credit  control,  from  the 
original.  Since  the  reforms  of the  1930s,  in particu- 
lar, the  System  has become  undeniably  a central  bank 
or,  more  precisely,  a  central  banking  system. 
The  System  today  retains,  however,  sufficient 
vestiges  of  its  pristine  form  to  continue  to  be  de- 
scribed  as unique  among  the  world’s  central  banks. 
In particular,  in the  face  of  increased  centralization 
of power  in the  System  since  the  1930s,  the  regional 
Reserve  Banks  continue  to  play  an  important  role. 
Their  operations  are  crucial  to  the  maintenance  of 
an efficient  payments  system  for the  country.  Their 
information  services  constitute  useful  inputs  into 
decisions  of businesses  large and small and by govern- 
ments.  Their  role  in monetary  policymaking  today 
differs  considerably  from  what  was envisaged  in the 
original  act  but  is no  less  significant.  Rather  it  has 
been  restructured  to  bring  it into  closer  conformity 
with  radically  revised  views  regarding  techniques  of 
monetary  and  credit  control.  The  directorates  of the 
Reserve  Banks  continue  to  take  the  initiative  in 
setting  the  discount  rate.  More  important,  the 
executive  heads  of  the  Reserve  Banks,  now  styled 
presidents  instead  of governors,28  serve  actively  on 
the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee,  the  System’s 
chief  policymaking  body.‘ 
28 Since  1936  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  has  been  named  the 
Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  and  its 
members  are  now  called  “governors.” 
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